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ABSTRACT: Are grounding claims fully general in character? If an object a is F in vir-
tue of being G, does it follow that anything that’s G is F for that reason? According to 
the thesis of Weak Formality, the answer is ‘yes’. In this paper, however, I argue that 
there is philosophical utility in rejecting this thesis. More exactly, I argue that two 
currently unresolved problems in contemporary metaphysics can be dealt with if we 
hold that there can be cases of ‘kind-dependent grounding’, the key thought being 
that once we allow for such cases, we must also accept that Weak Formality is false.  
 
 
 
If somebody claims of something named or unnamed that it moves, or runs or 
is white, he is liable to be asked the question by which Aristotle sought to define 
the category of substance: What is it that moves (or runs or is white)? Perhaps one 
who makes the claim that something moves does not need to know the answer 
to this question in order to enter his claim. It is not hard to envisage circum-
stances in which he can know that it moves without knowing what the thing is. 
Yet it seems certain…that, for each thing that satisfies a predicate such as 
‘moves’, ‘runs’ or ‘white’, there must exist some…kind to which the item  
belongs and by reference to which the ‘what is it’ question could be answered.  
                       
                               —   Wiggins, D. (: ) 
 
[C]ertain conditions may produce a background to other conditions having a 
determinative role even though they do not themselves have a determinative 
role. 
             
                                         —   Fine (: ) 
 
 
  Introduction 
 
Suppose that a is F in virtue of being G. Does this mean everything that’s G is F for 
that reason?  
 It would initially seem so. As Rosen () writes: 
 
If Fred is handsome in virtue of his symmetrical features and deep green eyes, then 
anyone with a similar face would have to be handsome for the same reason. Particular 
grounding facts must always be subsumable under general laws, or so it seems.   
(: ) 
 
Audi () delivers the same verdict: 
 
Let us suppose that you have a (defeasible) reason to believe that P in virtue of a  
certain sensory experience…It is not peculiar to you that when you have this experi-
ence, it grounds a reason of the relevant sort. Anyone with an experience of the same 
kind will have a reason of precisely the same kind. Grounding relations do not vary 
 
 
 
 
from instance to instance of the properties involved in the facts in question. Similarly, 
they do not vary from world to world. (: —)  
 
Following Rosen (), let us refer to the principle gestured towards here as Weak 
Formality.1 This states that if some possible object, a, is F in virtue of being G, 
then, if any possible object, b, is G, b is F in virtue of being G.2 In symbols: 
 
 Weak Formality: (x) (F) (G) [(Gx < Fx) → □ (y) (Gy → (Gy < Fy))] 
 
(Following Fine a, one should read ‘Gx < Fx’ as Gx grounds Fx, that is, as Fx 
holds in virtue of Gx. As throughout, I have in mind the notion of full rather than 
partial ground—on that distinction see Rosen . For more on grounding itself, 
see §, though I assume here that reader has a basic familiarity with this notion.) 
 The principle of Weak Formality is certainly intuitive. However, I will argue in 
that there is philosophical utility in rejecting it, by claiming that there is something 
to be gained from allowing for cases of ‘kind-dependent grounding’, the idea being 
that if we allow for such cases, then we must say that Weak Formality is false.3,4   
 Plan. I begin by saying something more about the notion of grounding itself 
(§). I then set out a crucial passage from Rosen (), discussion of which will 
help us work towards the key notion of kind-dependent grounding that this paper 
appeals to (§). Along the way, we will encounter the idea that each object instanti-
ates a fundamental kind, which can determine the properties it may have, plus the 
idea that grounding claims can hold conditionally. The following two sections then 
put the notion of kind-dependent grounding to work, in connection with two ex-
tant metaphysical problems (§–). The final section of the article concludes (§). 
 
  Grounding  
 
Many philosophers believe that, in addition to causation, we should recognise 
a further determinative relation that is constitutive in character, and which obtains  
between facts at a time rather than events over time.5 This relation is widely referred 
to as ‘grounding’, claims of which are typically expressed in terms of the ‘in virtue 
                                                   
 1 For the stronger principle, Formality, see Rosen (: ).  
 2 Cf. Rosen (: ), who notes that Weak Formality ‘tells us that if some possible thing is 
green in virtue of having a certain spectral reflectance profile, then as a matter of necessity, anything 
with that profile is green in virtue of possessing it’.  
 3 The debate regarding Weak Formality is analogous to the corresponding the debate between 
Davidson () and Anscombe () as to whether causation is general or singular. For helpful 
discussion regarding this latter debate see Hitchcock (). 
 4 It is perhaps worth noting that whilst we are rejecting Weak Formality, we can nevertheless 
retain the following widely accepted necessitation principle, namely: 
 
 Necessitation: (∆) (Γ) (∆ < Γ) → □ (∆ → ∆ <  Γ)  
 
(That is, if one fact grounds another, then necessarily, whenever the first fact obtains, it grounds the 
other.) For, even if only some things are F in virtue of being G, it might still be the case that if some 
particular thing a is F in virtue of being G, then necessarily, whenever it is G, it is F for that reason.   
 5 I assume here, for ease of exposition, that causation relates events—but nothing of importance 
turns on this assumption. As for facts, I am thinking of these as worldly entities—along the lines of 
Fine () and Audi ().  
 
 
 
 
of’ locution. Since there is already a vast literature on the topic of metaphysical 
grounding, my introductory remarks will be kept brief. (Some key literature here 
includes Audi ; Fine , a; Rosen ; Schaﬀer , .) 
 To say that a certain fact Γ grounds some other fact ∆ is to say that ∆ obtains in 
virtue of . That is, it is to say that the latter fact constitutes the ontological basis of 
the former fact. So, if  grounds ∆, then  is the more fundamental of the two, and 
∆ is the less fundamental (and the more derivative).6 Moreover, if  grounds ∆, 
then there is a non-causal, constitutive sense in which ∆ holds because  does.  
  To borrow an image from Schaﬀer (), the relation between grounding and 
causation can be thought of as follows: whilst causation drives the world through 
time, grounding drives the world through levels. Causation takes us from one event  
occurring at a time to another event occurring at a later time. The former event is 
thus causally generative of the latter. In a similar way, the thought goes, grounding 
takes us from some more fundamental fact to another, less fundamental fact. The 
former fact is therefore ground-theoretically generative of the latter.  
 As this brings out, both causation and grounding are ‘building’ or ‘generative’ 
relations (cf. Bennett ), and, hence, relations of determination. Moreover, both 
relations back distinctive types of explanation. If event e causes event e, then e 
occurs because e occurs—in a causal sense of ‘because’. Likewise, if fact  grounds 
fact ∆, then ∆ obtains because of Γ—in a constitutive sense of ‘because’.7 
 That being said, and unlike some authors, I do not identify grounding with 
metaphysical explanation (although the latter relation can, it would appear, also be 
expressed with phrases like ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’.) Rather, in my view, just as 
we should distinguish the causal relation from the causal explanations that it backs, 
so too, we should distinguish grounding from the metaphysical explanations that it 
backs. Accordingly, just as ‘causation’ and ‘causal explanation’ are distinct, so 
‘grounding’ and ‘metaphysical explanation’ are distinct (cf. Schaﬀer .) 
 I have been writing as if grounding is a relation on facts, and I will continue to 
assume this in what follows. (However, I will also speak loosely of ‘x’s Gness 
grounding x’s Fness’. This should be taken as an informal expression of the claim 
that the fact that x is F is grounded by the fact that x is G.) Note, however, that this 
assumption is contestable in various ways. Most of what I say here could probably 
be reformulated without the assumption that grounding is a relation between facts 
(were one to disagree with this idea). But I’ll assume the truth of this throughout.  
 I’ll close with some remarks about the logical properties of ground. It is stand-
ard to assume that grounding is reflexive, asymmetric, transitive, and well-founded. 
Grounding is thus widely conceived as a well-founded partial ordering over the 
domain of facts. To my mind, it seems plausible to think of grounding in this way. 
However, nothing I say here turns on that being right. (I note the standard assump-
tions just to help the reader gain a sense of what grounding is supposed to be.) 
 This completes my initial exposition of the grounding relation. (I’ll spare the 
reader a list of examples of grounding. There are enough in the literature.8) At this 
point, then, we can turn to the main task this paper, namely, to make a case against 
                                                   
 6 Plausibly, grounding can be one-one, many-one, and perhaps even many-many. But here I am 
interested in one-one cases. (Throughout I follow let ‘’ and ‘∆’ stand for arbitrary individual facts.) 
 7 For more on the relationship between grounding and causation see Schaﬀer () and Wilson 
().  
  8 But see especially Rosen (: —) and Schaﬀer (: —.)  
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Weak Formality, by interpreting and attempting to thereby solve two metaphysical 
problems in terms of the notion of ‘kind-dependent grounding’.   
 
  Kind-Dependent Grounding 
 
As we saw in the first section, one advocate of Weak Formality is Rosen (). In 
more recent work, however, Rosen () expresses scepticism about this principle: 
 
Weak Formality is not self-evident. It amounts to the claim that when Ga grounds Fa 
in some particular case, the capacity of the first fact to ground the second derives  
entirely from the distinctive powers of the predicable G, and not from the combina-
tion of G and a together. But why shouldn’t there be cases in which G and a conspire 
to make it the case that Fa, in part thanks to G and its distinctive powers, but also in 
thanks to a and its distinctive powers. (: , emphasis in the original)9  
 
The suggestion here, apparently, is that there could be cases wherein there is some 
diﬀerence between two items, a and b, whereby, although both a and b are G, it is 
only a that is F for that reason. That is, the thought appears to be that there might 
be some diﬀerence between two things a and b, such that when a is G, a is F in vir-
tue of being G, despite the fact that when b is G, b is not F for that reason.   
 There are, in fact, various ways to develop this idea. In what follows, however, I 
shall develop it in a specific manner, by appealing to two resources: the broadly neo-
Aristotelian idea of fundamental kind, and the notion of conditional grounding. 
 
. Fundamental Kinds 
 
There is a view, broadly Aristotelian in spirit, whereby all objects belong to (only) 
one (most specific) fundamental kind.10 To introduce this idea, we can reason like 
so. Intuitively, there is a diﬀerence between specifying what something is as opposed 
to merely saying how it is (cf. Fine b: ; Wiggins : ). We can begin to 
regiment this intuitive thought, moreover, by saying that to specify merely how 
something is, we merely need to list its properties, whereas to specify what some-
thing is, we need to specify its fundamental kind, i.e., we need to state what sort of 
thing x most fundamentally is. For example, to say that x is an animal or a person 
is, arguably, to say what x is, it is to specify what kind of object we are dealing with. 
In contrast, the claim that x is white, intuitively, merely says how x happens to be. 
One specifies one of the object’s properties; but one fails to disclose its fundamental 
kind. The thought is brought out nicely by Wiggins in the following passage: 
 
If somebody claims of something named or unnamed that it moves, or runs or is 
white, he is liable to be asked the question by which Aristotle sought to define the cat-
egory of substance: What is it that moves (or runs or is white)? Perhaps one who 
makes the claim that something moves does not need to know the answer to this 
question in order to enter his claim. It is not hard to envisage circumstances in which 
he can know that it moves without knowing what the thing is. Yet it seems cer-
                                                   
 9 I have edited this passage slightly, replacing instances of the schematic ‘Ф’ with instances of 
‘F’. This, however, is just to bring Rosen’s notation in line with my own.  
 10 Such kinds have also been referred to as ‘substance kinds’ (see Wiggins , ), and as 
‘primary kinds’ (see Baker , ). I take the term ‘fundamental kind’ is from Martin ().  
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tain…that, for each thing that satisfies a predicate such as ‘moves’, ‘runs’ or ‘white’, 
there must exist some…kind to which the item belongs and by reference to which the 
‘what is it’ question could be answered. (: ) 
 
In this paper, I will take this basic framework for granted (the rationale being: it can 
do valuable metaphysical work). I assume also one particular element of the frame-
work, namely, that fundamental kinds can determine, in at least some cases, what 
properties their instances can have. One way to showcase the plausibility of this idea 
is via examples. If, for example, x is a proposition, then plausibly, x is essentially and 
most fundamentally so. It is plausible, moreover, to think it’s because x is a proposi-
tion that x can have certain features and not others. For instance, a proposition may 
be true or false, but neither red nor blue. And plausibly, this is because propositions 
are not the kind of thing that can be coloured, but are the kind of thing that can 
have truth-values. We can therefore explain why propositions can have truth-values 
but not colours by appealing to what kind of thing they most fundamentally are.   
 Manifold further examples are possible. A sphere may be misshapen, but not 
ungrammatical. A wedding can be joyous or boring, but not prime or even. A heap 
of sand, plausibly anyway, cannot survive a change in parts, whereas animals and 
plants seemingly can. All of these diﬀerences in properties, quite plausibly, are 
traceable in some sense to the fundamental kind the relevant item instantiates.11 
 Suppose, then, that we allow that fundamental kinds can determine what prop-
erties their instances may have. In light of this, it appears we should grant also that 
fundamental kinds can determine which grounding relations their instances are and 
are not able to enter into. If, for example, an object x is of fundamental kind K, and 
if, for that reason, x is unable to have the property of being F, then it follows that x 
cannot be F in virtue of being G. Moreover, this will be so even if x is G, and, im-
portantly, even if other things, which are not K’s, are F in virtue of being G.12  
 Return now to the illustrative case involving a and b. If we are to reject Weak 
Formality in a plausible way, then as per Rosen’s suggestion, we must locate a rele-
vant diﬀerence between these objects that could underwrite the fact that only a is F 
in virtue of being G, although both a and b are G. My suggestion at this point—
given that fundamental kinds can determine what properties their instances may 
have, and thus determine what grounding relations their instances may enter into—
is that the relevant diﬀerence between a and b is one of fundamental kind.  
 Suppose that a is most fundamentally a K, whilst b is most fundamentally a K*, 
whereby Ks are able to be F, but K*s are not. Suppose also that both Ks and K*s 
can be G (as witnessed by the fact that both a and b, a K and a K* respectively, are 
G). In this situation, I claim, the diﬀerence in fundamental kind between the ob-
jects can underwrite the fact that whilst a and b are both G, only a is F for that rea-
son. (Given that a is the kind of thing that can be F, whilst b is not, it is only a that 
can be F in virtue of being G, even though both a and b are G.) On this view, it is 
                                                   
 11 Notably, I do not say that a thing’s fundamental kind fixes its modal profile entirely, so that x’s 
being fundamentally a K determines the full range of properties that x is able to have. (Perhaps x 
could not have had another origin than the one that it has. On the face of it anyway, this is a fact 
about the properties x can/cannot have that does not trace to its fundamental kind.) 
 12 It might be, of course, that in some cases, if a thing is unable to have the grounded property 
because of the kind of thing it is, then for the same reason, it cannot have the grounding property. 
However, we should not just assume that all cases are like this. Perhaps, a in some cases, a thing x 
can have grounding property G but not the various properties {F} that G is otherwise able to ground.  
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the diﬀerence in fundamental kind between a and b that makes it so that Ga 
grounds Fa, even though even whilst b is G, it is not so that Gb grounds Fb.   
 This is the beginning of the account I want, ultimately, to defend. As things 
stand, however, important details must be filled in. Consider, for example, the role 
that fundamental kinds play in the story. Are they to be conceived as partial 
grounds—so that when a is F in virtue of being G, a is F partly in virtue of being G 
and partly in virtue of being a K? Or is the role of fundamental kinds something 
diﬀerent? Well, the answer has to be the latter, if the notion of kind-dependent 
grounding is to perform genuinely interesting work. After all, it is hardly news that 
one thing can be F partly in virtue of being G even if this isn’t so for all the Gs, and 
even if some Gs fail to be F entirely. The really interesting possibility, therefore, as 
introduced at the outset of this paper, is that one thing might be F solely in virtue of 
being G, even though there are some Gs that are not F. The point is that if we want 
to make good on this possibility then we cannot assign to fundamental kinds the 
role of partial grounds. Rather, we must assign instead some alternative role.  
 How, then, are we to model the fact that a’s being of kind K somehow deter-
mines that a is F in virtue of being G, without treating the fact that a is a K as a 
partial ground of the fact that a is F (alongside the fact that a is G)? My suggestion 
will be that we should develop this thought in terms of the notion of conditional 
grounding. As we will see, this will enable us to conceive of fundamental kinds as 
enablers on certain grounding relations obtaining rather than partial grounds.13 
 
. Conditional Grounding 
 
In the literature on causation, a distinction is sometimes drawn between causes and 
conditions.14 That is, it is sometimes claimed that there are cases wherein an event A 
causes a further event B only given that some background condition is met.  
Absent this further condition, so the idea goes, and A would not be able to cause B. 
(That is, whilst A would still obtain, it would not cause B.) As an example, one 
might, for example, claim that striking the match causes the fire only given that the 
background condition of oxygen being present is met. On this view, were oxygen to 
have been absent, striking the match would not have caused the fire. So whilst (the 
event that is) the striking of the match would still have occurred, it would have 
been unable to cause the fire, due to the absence of a necessary background condi-
tion on this event performing its causal work, viz. the presence of oxygen. 
 To be clear, the thought here is not that the alleged conditions involved in these 
causal facts are just further partial causes. Rather, the idea is that if C is a condition 
on event A causing event B, then, rather than being a further cause of B, C is that 
                                                   
 13 The notion of conditional grounding (which is not my own) has recently been put to work in 
a variety of theoretical contexts. Kit Fine (, ), for example, argues that we need to make use 
of conditional grounding in order to properly model the role that existence facts play with respect to 
the holding of diachronic identities. Meanwhile, Ralf Bader (manuscript-a) and Ted Sider (inde-
pendently) argue that we should appeal to conditional grounding (which Sider calls ‘grounding-
qua’) in order to handle the problem of truth-grounding universal generalisations. And in other 
work, Bader () also argues that we need the notion of conditional grounding in order to proper-
ly model the way in which reasons can vary across contexts (cf. here Dancy : ch. ). The notion 
of conditional grounding is also rather similar to the notion of an ‘anchor’ in Epstein (). 
 14 For relevant discussion of this kind of distinction see Bader (manuscript-b), Dancy (: ch. 
) and Schaﬀer (). A classic source of scepticism about the distinction is Mill (: ).  
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which enables the causal relation to hold between A and B in the first place. It is 
part of the idea, then, that certain things can play a role in generating events with-
out playing a causal role. On this conception, instead of playing a causal role, the 
idea is that certain things can act as background conditions whose role is to enable 
the causal relation to obtain between the eﬀect and the cause.15 
 In my view, a similar distinction can be drawn in the case of grounding. What 
we can claim is that, just as, in some cases, one event, A, causes another event, B, 
only given that some background condition C is met, so too, in some cases, one fact 
Γ grounds another fact ∆ only given that some condition  is met. In short, the 
idea is that just as background conditions might be relevant to the production of an 
event without themselves being causes of that event, so too, certain background 
conditions might be relevant to the obtaining of a fact without themselves being 
grounds of that fact. As Fine (: ) summaries: ‘[C]ertain conditions may 
produce a background to other conditions having a determinative role even though 
they do not themselves have a determinative role’. (Cf. also Bader manuscript-a, 
who notes that ‘[n]ot everything that plays a role in making it the case that some-
thing else is the case needs to play a grounding-role’, since ‘things can also be rele-
vant by being conditions that must be satisfied for other things to do their ground-
ing work’. 
 To make sense of conditional grounding, we must distinguish the diﬀerent roles 
things can play in making a fact obtain. Suppose that Γ conditionally grounds ∆, 
and suppose that the condition on this grounding relation holding is that Ф ob-
tains. In this case, the grounding relation holds solely between Γ and ∆. However, 
the grounding relation holds between these facts only given that the condition, Ф, 
is met. Moreover, it is part of the view that Γ and Ф play fundamentally diﬀerent 
roles in making ∆ obtain. For, while Γ plays a grounding role, Ф plays the role of a 
condition, i.e., whereas Γ acts as the ground of ∆, Ф acts as the condition on the 
grounding relation between Γ and ∆ obtaining (the condition’s role in making ∆ 
obtain being to enable Γ to perform its grounding work, rather than acting as even 
a partial ground for ∆.) 
 Conditions, then, are not to be treated as partial grounds (just as conditions in 
the causal case are not to be thought of as further causes, at least on the view 
sketched above). Rather, they are to be understood as playing diﬀerent roles entirely 
to grounds. Specifically, they should be thought of as playing a sui generis role in 
helping to make it the case that certain facts obtain, by enabling the grounding rela-
tion to hold between the grounding and the grounded fact.16 Consequently, to un-
derstand conditional grounding, we have to draw a robust distinction between 
grounds and conditions, whereby conditions simply enable the relevant grounding 
relations to obtain. (I take this assumption as unproblematic here. However, I real-
ise that one could contest the grounds/conditions distinction in various ways.)  
                                                   
 15 Note that I am non-committal as to whether there really are such things as non-causal condi-
tions that enable causal relations to hold. (I appeal to the causal case only for illustrative purposes.) 
 16 Cf. Sider on the notion of grounding-qua, which is very much like the notion of conditional 
grounding that I am presently appealing to. According to Sider (manuscript: ): ‘grounding-qua 
statements must be understood as sui generis, in that they cannot be defined as meaning that [a cer-
tain collection of facts] A…, together with the further statement that they satisfy the condition, 
ground B in the orthodox sense. The further statement [i.e. the condition] is not part of the ground 
of B; rather it is in light of the further statement [condition] that A,…ground B’. 
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. Kinds as Conditions  
 
With the notion of conditional grounding introduced, return now to the case in-
volving a and b. We now suppose that whilst a is the kind of thing that can be F, 
the same is not true of b. The thought is that for this reason, a is F in virtue of being 
G, whilst b is not, although both items are G. The question we are presently en-
gaged with is is how exactly to model this. How should we think about the role of 
fundamental kinds in making it so that whilst a is F in virtue of being G, neverthe-
less b is F but not G? My suggestion is that we can model this in terms of condi-
tional grounding, treating fundamental kinds as conditions. When a is F in virtue 
of being G, the grounding relation holds only given the condition that a is funda-
mentally a K. The fact that a is a K thus acts as an enabling condition on a being F 
in virtue of being G. That a is G is consequently the sole and full ground of the fact 
that a is F. The fact that a is a K is simply what enables this grounding relation to 
obtain. As for b, the fact that b is a K* acts as a disabler on b being F in virtue of 
being G. Given that b is a K*, and given that unlike Ks, K*s cannot be F, it follows 
that b cannot be F, and hence cannot be F in virtue of being G. So, although b is G, 
b is not F in virtue of being G, since b is not the kind of thing that can be F.  
 Let us say that in general, cases wherein some x is F in virtue of being G, but 
only on the condition that x is fundamentally a K, are cases of kind-dependent 
grounding. What I now wish to point out is that, given that cases of kind-dependent 
grounding are possible, Weak Formality has to be rejected.  
 After all, Weak Formality entails that if two things are G, and if one of them is 
F in virtue of being G, then both things are F in virtue of being G. However, this is 
not so if cases of kind-dependent grounding are possible. For it might be that whilst 
two things are G, only one of them is the kind of thing that can be F, meaning that 
only one of them is the kind of thing that can be F in virtue of being G.17 
 In the following two sections, I explain how two outstanding problems within 
contemporary metaphysics can be handled when viewed as cases of kind-dependent 
grounding. This will provide us with broadly abductive reasons for accepting that 
cases of kind-dependent grounding are possible and that Weak Formality is false.18   
 
. Kinds as Basic 
 
Before moving on, one further thing must be said regarding fundamental kinds. 
Earlier, I said that in specifying x’s fundamental kind, one specifies what sort of  
                                                   
 17 Strictly speaking, to show that Weak Formality is false, we need to go further than just show-
ing that there can be cases of kind-dependent grounding. For in fact, we need a case that shows 
whilst in general, things that are G are F in virtue of being G (so long as they are the right kind of 
thing), it is also the case that there could be two objects that are both G, even though only one of the 
is kind of thing that can be F. (The following two sections of this paper in eﬀect provide the basis for 
a broadly abductive argument to the eﬀect that cases of this kind are indeed possible.) 
 18 Certain variations on the notion of kind-dependent grounding may also be of interest. For 
example, in place of kind-dependent grounding, one might consider the idea of essence-dependent 
grounding, or form-depending grounding…, and so on and so forth. (Since the essence, or form, or 
mode of composition, of an object can be thought of as determining which properties it can have, 
we can also imagine cases in which the essence, or form, or mode of composition…, of an object 
determines which grounding relations it can enter into.) One may even prefer to think about the 
metaphysical puzzles discussed below in terms of some such alternative notion.  
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thing x essentially and most fundamentally is. That is, one says not merely how x is, 
but rather what x is. What I now want to add is that, in my view, fundamental 
kinds are fundamental in another sense: that is, they are fundamental not only in 
that they tell us what the object essentially and most fundamentally is, but also fun-
damental in that when something is of some fundamental kind K, there is nothing 
in virtue of which that is so. In short, fundamental kinds are ground-theoretically 
fundamental, since their instantiation is ungrounded. This view is plausible, I claim, 
because in specifying an object’s fundamental kind we specify what sort of thing it 
essentially is. But arguably, we needn’t explain why an item has the essence that it 
does. Explanation has to come to an end somewhere, and, as Hawthorne & 
McGonical (: ) point out, the idea that explanation comes to an end when 
we begin talking about the essence of an object looks rather plausible. As they ex-
plain: ‘[a]ll views have foundational facts that are not in turn grounded in further, 
deeper facts’. On the view that I advocate in this paper, the facts regarding what an 
object most fundamentally and essentially is are such foundational facts.19   
 Of course, this view of matters is not uncontroversial. Indeed, for some kinds, it 
may seem much more plausible to think that there must be some ground-
theoretical explanation as to why the object is the kind of thing that it is. Consider, 
for instance, the kind statue, which one might plausibly take to be a fundamental 
kind in my sense (after all, in saying that x is a statue, one thereby says what x is and 
not merely how x is.) As Kit Fine notes: 
 
Surely…there must be some [ground-theoretic] account of what is involved in being a 
statue or a piece of clay, from which it should then be apparent why a given object is 
the one rather than the other. (: ) 
 
So the worry is: not all fundamental kinds can be ungrounded (basic, fundamental) 
since at least some of them clearly demand ground-theoretic explanation.  
 There are various ways to respond to this objection. But my main reply is this. 
As we will see in the next section, with the assumption being challenged by the  
objector about fundamental kinds in the background, i.e. given the assumption that 
fundamental kinds are basic and ungrounded, we can solve two important meta-
physical problems that are presently unresolved. The idea is that this, together with 
the aforementioned connection between kinds and essence, provides us with strong 
grounds for thinking accepting that kinds are indeed basic. Doubtless, there are 
other ways to reply to this worry. However, for reasons of space, I will not discuss 
further possible replies here. Instead, I shall just assume in what follows that fun-
damental kinds are not in need of grounding due to being ground-theoretically 
basic The aim will then be to showcase the work that this assumption can do, in 
conjunction with the idea that there can be cases of kind-dependent grounding. 
  
 
                                                   
 19 N.b. the view that fundamental kinds are ground-theoretically fundamental is not built into 
the very notion of a fundamental kind. That is, one could in principle believe that each thing falls 
under a fundamental kind in the sense of that term introduced above without thinking that when 
they do fall under some such kind, there is nothing that grounds the fact that they fall under it. It 
just that in this paper, I also add the further claim that these facts are indeed ungrounded. 
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  Coinciding Objects 
 
 
Many believe that distinct material objects can coincide, i.e., that two or more ob-
jects can wholly occupy the same region of space and be composed of the same mi-
crophysical parts at once. Consider, for example, a statue and the lump of clay mak-
ing it up. The statue cannot survive being squashed; after all, it must have a certain 
form or structure in order to exist, one that it would lose if it were squashed. But 
the lump could survive being squashed. Accordingly, the statue and the lump diﬀer 
in properties, and so by Leibniz’s Law are distinct.20 Given this fact, the most plau-
sible thing to say it seems is that they are distinct yet coincident objects.  
 Or consider a person and her body. The person wouldn’t survive even a gentle 
death; with death the person ceases to be. The body, however, could well survive a 
gentle death. So, plausibly, we have to hold that the person and her body are dis-
tinct, coincident items (cf. Johnston :  and Sosa : —).21 
 In the next sub-section, I will focus on cases that apparently involve coincident 
objects that instantiate diﬀerent fundamental kinds. (Therefore, I set aside alleged 
cases of ‘same-kind coincidence’).22 Specifically, I focus on coincident objects that 
diﬀer in (at least some of) their non-basic properties. The trouble, as we will see, is 
that it’s diﬃcult to make sense of how coincident objects could diﬀer in such prop-
erties. What I will also show, however, is that we can, ultimately, make sense of this 
if we allow for cases of kind-dependent grounding and reject Weak Formality.  
 The following sub-section deals with an objection. What will emerge is the idea 
that plausibly, the kind of item that something most fundamentally is can deter-
mine, not only which non-basic properties it can have (simpliciter), and, hence, 
which non-basic properties it can have in virtue of others that are more basic, but 
also which properties can act as grounds for certain less basic ones. This will also 
bring out a further way in which the Weak Formality principle might fail. 
 
. The Problem 
 
Focus on the statue/lump case. These items are fundamentally diﬀerent kinds of  
object: one is a statue, the other is a lump (of clay). Now it’s often said that there’s a 
problem regarding how the statue and the lump could diﬀer in kind, since they are 
composed of the same microphysical parts. However, there is only a problem here if 
we assume that what kind of thing that something fundamentally is depends on its 
microphysical profile. Yet I deny that assumption. In my view, there is nothing that 
explains why an object is the kind of thing it is (cf. §.). The fact that an object is 
                                                   
 20 Some philosophers have tried to resist this style of argument by appealing to ‘predicational 
shifts’ (though see Fine  for some powerful criticisms of this move). Others have developed the 
considerably more radical option of rejecting Leibniz’s Law, by appealing to some form of relative 
identity (for further discussion of these matters see Burke  and Noonan ). 
 21 Manifold similar examples could be given here. For instance, it is often said that a person 
would ‘go with the brain’ in a brain-transplant case, whilst the body would stay on the operating 
table. This again would appear to establish the distinctness of these items (see Shoemaker ). 
 22 In fact, I follow Locke () and Wiggins (, ) in holding that there are no such 
cases. (See Fine  and Johnston  for arguments to the contrary.) 
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most fundamentally an item of kind K is not explicable in more basic terms. There 
is no ground for the fact that x is fundamentally a K (and not, say, a K*).23 
 Accordingly, in my view, we can accept, unproblematically, the idea that the 
statue and the lump are fundamentally diﬀerent kinds of thing. But this is not to 
say that coincident items pose no problems at all. On the contrary, the fact that co-
incident apparently items diﬀer in their non-basic properties poses a real problem 
that demands a solution, the claim that kinds are basic notwithstanding. 
 Note first that when it comes to material things, it’s plausible to think their 
non-basic properties are (ultimately) grounded in underlying basic microphysical 
properties. If x is a material object, and if F is some non-basic property of x, then 
plausibly, there is some microphysical property M, which x has, such that x is F in 
virtue of having M. This view is standardly referred to as Microphysicalism.24 
 To focus on a specific example, consider the fact that whilst the statue is beauti-
ful, the lump it is coincident with is not. It follows that: 
 
 () The statue is beautiful. 
 () The lump is not beautiful. 
 
The reason trouble emerges is that, given the plausible premise that being beautiful is 
a non-basic property, plus Microphysicalism, we can derive a contradiction from () 
and (). At least, this is so if we accept that Weak Formality holds. To see this, note 
first that given Microphysicalism, claim () implies the following, namely: 
 
 () There is some microphysical property, M, such that the statue is beautiful  
  in virtue of having M.  
 
(In general, the microphysical properties of an object are a function of the proper-
ties and relations of the object’s microphysical parts. Accordingly, microphysical 
properties can be both intrinsic and extrinsic, at least on the present conception.) 
 Note also that, since grounding is factive, claim () entails: 
 
 () The statue has microphysical property M. 
 
                                                   
 23 Notice that one cannot solve the problem of explaining why coincident objects x and y diﬀer 
in kind despite being microphysically alike in the way that I just did unless one treats kinds as un-
grounded. That is part of why this assumption is crucial to this section. However, if one were able to 
explain how objects were to diﬀer in kind despite sharing their microphysical properties, then one 
could solve the problem I raise in this section for believers in coincidence without having to hold that 
fundamental kinds are ungrounded. (Good news, I suppose, for those who find that idea distasteful.) 
The trouble is that it really has proven rather hard to show how objects could diﬀer in kind despite 
sharing their microphysical properties, at least without treating kinds as basic in the way that I pro-
pose, as the massive literature on the so-called ‘grounding problem’ has eﬀectively shown. Accord-
ingly, I prefer to divide and conquer: we first take kinds as ungrounded, and then we use this to oﬀer 
an explanation for certain other diﬀerences that should be grounded in more basic ones.  
 24 Cf. the thesis of Mereological Supervenience in Kim (). In eﬀect, Microphysicalism is the 
ground-theoretic analogue of Kim’s thesis of Mereological Supervenience. (As I am sure Kim would 
recognise, it is something like Microphysicalism that rationalises Mereological Supervenience in the 
first place—since for Kim, supervenience relations merely suggest the presence of interesting de-
pendence relations like grounding but are not themselves such relations—see Kim : .) 
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But the statue and the lump are coincident, and are therefore composed from the 
same microphysical parts. Hence, the lump has all the same microphysical proper-
ties as the statue does. So we can derive: 
 
 () The lump has microphysical property M. 
 
We also know Weak Formality tells us that if some possible object a is F in virtue 
of being G, then, if any possible object b is G, b is F in virtue of being G. So, given 
(), if Weak Formality is true we can derive: 
 
 () If any object whatsoever has microphysical property M, then it is beautiful  
  in virtue of having M.  
 
() and () then entail: 
 
 () The lump is beautiful in virtue of having microphysical property M. 
 
And since grounding is factive, claim () entails: 
 
 () The lump is beautiful.  
 
The problem is that together, () and () engender the contradiction that the lump 
both is and isn’t beautiful. Moreover, the problem is quite general. Indeed, given 
Microphysicalism and Weak Formality, we end up facing this kind of problem 
whenever coincident objects diﬀer in terms of some non-basic property. 
 One way to react here would be to reject Microphysicalism. Another option 
would be to claim that all diﬀerences between coincident objects are ungrounded 
diﬀerences. However, these moves seem implausible. Moreover, there is a better 
way. For, we can instead put to work the notion of kind-dependent grounding. We 
can then reject Weak Formality, and block the inference from () and () to ().  
 This response depends on the intuitive claim that whilst the statue is the kind of 
thing that can be beautiful, the same is not true of the lump of clay. And for what it’s 
worth, this claim feels correct to me. If something is a statue, it is the sort of thing 
that can be beautiful, whereas if something is a lump (of clay), then it is not the 
kind of thing that can be beautiful.25 For present purposes, suppose that we accept 
this claim.26 Then if we grant that being beautiful is a non-basic property of the 
statue, and also grant Microphysicalism, we must accept that there’s some micro-
physical property, M, in virtue of which the statue is beautiful. However, if the 
statue is only able to be beautiful given it’s the kind of thing able to have this property, 
then what we have is a case of kind-dependent grounding. That is, we have a case 
                                                   
 25 One might argue to the contrary that whenever lumps of clay and statues are coincident, both 
items will be beautiful. But this is not a worry for me, for whilst it would show, were it true, that 
lumps are not the kind of thing that cannot be beautiful, it would also show that beauty, at least 
when it come to statues and lumps, is not one of the properties apt to generate instances of problem 
we are concerned with. (More generally, whenever the constituting item shares the non-basic proper-
ty with the constituted item, then we do not have an instance of the problem we are dealing with.) 
 26 Again, one could also accept a variation on this claim, according to which the statue but not 
the lump is able to beautiful because it has a certain form, or essence, etc. (cf. fn.  above). 
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wherein, although () is true, it is true only given that the object in question (the 
statue) is a certain kind of thing. It follows that claim () would be more perspica-
ciously written as follows: 
 
 (*) There is some microphysical property, M, such that the statue is beautiful  
  in virtue of having M, whereby this grounding relation holds only given  
  that the statue is the kind of thing it is. 
 
On this view, whilst the statue is beautiful in virtue of having M, the fact that the 
statue has M makes it so that it is beautiful only given that it meets the condition of 
being a certain kind of thing. Call the particular statue s. We can then put this 
point by saying that the fact <that s has M> grounds the further fact <that s is beau-
tiful> only given that s meets the condition of being the kind of thing that can be 
beautiful, In short, s’s fundamental kind enables the grounding relation to obtain 
between the grounding fact <that s has M> and the grounded fact <that s is beauti-
ful>. 
 This view implies that having microphysical property M is not suﬃcient for  
being beautiful. For in addition, an item must meet the condition of being the sort 
of thing that can instantiate the property of being beautiful. Thus, were something 
to not be the kind of thing that can be beautiful, then even if it were to have micro-
physical property M, it would not be beautiful for that reason. So it also follows 
that Weak Formality is false; the same is then true for the more specific (). (For, if 
being beautiful depends on being a certain kind of thing, only things of the relevant 
kind (or kinds) can be beautiful in virtue of having microphysical property M.) In-
stead of (), moreover, what is true is something more like: 
 
 (*) If any object whatsoever has microphysical property M, then if that  
    object is the kind of thing that can be beautiful, it is beautiful in virtue 
    of having M.  
 
This reformulation suggests a more general re-formulation of Weak Formality (let-
ting ‘KF’ stand for the predicate ‘is the kind of thing that is able to be F’): 
 
 Kind-Dependent Formality: 
  (x) (F) (G) (Gx < Fx) → □ [(y) (Gy & KF y→ (Gy < Fy))] 
 
Thus, once we recognise that there can be cases of kind-dependent grounding, we 
can resolve, in a compelling way, a problem that arises for those who claim that 
there are diﬀerences in non-basic properties between coincident things.27 This strat-
                                                   
 27 Moreover, if we can maintain that whenever coincident objects diﬀer in terms of some non-
basic property, this can always be traced back to a diﬀerence in fundamental kind between them, 
then we can oﬀer a compelling answer to what Koslicki () calls the ‘similarity problem’. Essen-
tially, the problem here is to explain not only how the coincident objects manage to diﬀer in certain 
ways, but also why in certain respects they are the same. That is, we have to explain why some prop-
erties (like mass) are shared, whilst others (like beauty) are not shared. My answer is that the shared 
properties are either those that are not kind-dependent or those that are kind-dependent but that can 
be had by both statues and lumps, whereas those that are not shared are ‘kind-dependent properties’ 
that can be had only by statues and not lumps/only by lumps and not statues. Given this view, I 
 
 
 
 
egy, however, requires rejecting Weak Formality, replacing it with Kind-
Dependent Formality.  I submit is that this provides motivation for rejecting the 
former principle. 
 Notice, also, that same basic strategy as employed above can be used to solve a 
whole range of similar problems. For, if we grant Microphysicalism, then we face 
exactly the same problem whenever we wish to allow that coincident objects diﬀer 
regarding any non-basic property. So since it seems plausible to think that whenever 
such objects diﬀer in their non-basic properties in this way, this is traceable to some 
diﬀerence in fundamental kind, we can employ the same basic strategy as above in 
order to avoid contradiction when wishing to claim that the coincident objects gen-
uinely diﬀer in terms of the non-basic property in question. For instance, by appeal-
ing to the kind-dependent grounding strategy, we might be able to make headway 
with the longstanding problem regarding modal diﬀerences between material 
things. For it is plausible to hold that these modal diﬀerences are in some way at 
least traceable to a diﬀerence in fundamental kind.28 We might also be able to make 
headway with the important problem as to how persons and their bodies manage to 
diﬀer in consciousness. For, the diﬀerence in consciousness between a person and a 
body would also seem to be traceable in some sense to the fact that whilst the per-
son is the kind of thing that can be conscious, the body of the person is not.29 
 
. An Objection 
 
I now want to deal with an objection to the kind of view regarding cases of coinci-
dence that I have set out so far. Imagine the following case. We have a piece of met-
al constituting a statue. In this particular case, moreover, the piece of metal is not 
valuable, but the statue is. The trouble is one might think that it is just not true that 
things of the kind piece of metal are, in virtue of their kind, unable to be valuable. 
After all, perhaps some pieces of metal are valuable whilst some others are not. 
 The general problem here is this. It might be so that x and y are coincident and 
so share microphysical properties. And they might diﬀer in non-basic property F. 
My way to avoid contradiction would be to claim that if, say, x lacks F whilst y has 
it, then x is the kind of thing that cannot be F, and so cannot be F in virtue of the 
base properties it shares with y (§.). But perhaps this won’t cover all cases. For 
perhaps, whilst x is not F, other things of the same fundamental kind as x are F. 
 Let’s grant, for the sake of argument, that such cases are possible. My response is 
to invoke a diﬀerent way in which fundamental kinds can condition what ground-
ing relations their instances may enter into. Consider the case of the piece of metal 
                                                                                                                                        
submit, we can oﬀer a plausible and principled account as to why, for example, the statue and the 
lump diﬀer with respect to certain properties but not others. 
 28 Cf. Fine (: ): ‘when we ask how it is possible for the piece of alloy to survive being 
moulded into the shape of a sphere but not possible for the statue, then the answer which most natu-
rally suggests itself is that it is because the one is a piece of alloy and the other is a statue of Goliath 
that they enjoy the capacities or incapacities for variation in shape that they do.’ 
 29 Indeed, it just sounds wrong to say that my body is thinking. As David Wiggins writes, in 
connection with the idea that we human persons are identical with our bodies, so that our bodies are 
thinking beings with the same full range of mental capacities as ourselves, ‘…there is something  
extremely unnatural—so unnatural that the upshot is simply falsity—in the proposition that peo-
ple’s bodies play chess, talk sense, know arithmetic, or even run or jump or sit down.’ (Wiggins  
—; cf. Fine :  and Johnston : .) 
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that is not valuable—the one that is coincident with a statue that is valuable. Given 
Microphysicalism and Weak Formality, the piece of metal ought to be valuable 
when it is not. Moreover, I cannot respond by saying that the piece of metal is not 
the kind of thing that can be valuable and therefore not the kind of thing that can 
be valuable in virtue of having microphysical property M, i.e. the same microphysi-
cal property that makes the statue valuable, granting that some pieces of metal can 
be valuable. For it is just not true (or so we are granting) that things of the kind 
piece of metal are not as such able to be valuable. What can be said, however, is that 
pieces of metal are not the kind of thing that can be valuable in virtue of having mi-
crophysical property M. Regarding those pieces of metal that are valuable, they must 
be valuable in virtue of having diﬀerent base properties than those pieces of metal 
that are not valuable. And so they must be valuable in virtue of having diﬀerent base 
properties to that base property the piece of metal coincident with the statue (the 
one that is not valuable) shares with that statue, namely, microphysical property M.  
 This view is not ad hoc. If kinds can determine what non-basic properties a thing 
can have, should they not also be able to determine which base properties can (con-
ditionally) ground certain of their non-basic properties?  (That is: it should be pos-
sible that for things of kind K, being of kind K means that you can be F in virtue of 
basic property G, but not F in virtue of basic property H, etc.) Moreover, this view 
has the virtue of explaining why some instances of a kind can have non-basic prop-
erty F whilst others cannot. The answer is: their kind determines that certain base 
properties can make them F whilst other similar base properties cannot. 
 We now see another way in which Weak Formality might fail. Again, this thesis 
claims that if x and y both have G, and if x is F in virtue of being G, then both 
must be F in virtue of being G. I set out one way in which this might be false just 
above. The second way in which that principle might fail then turns on the fact that 
there might be cases wherein some x lacks F and y has F, yet wherein also, whilst x 
is the kind of thing that can be F, it is not the kind of thing that can be F in virtue 
of being G (even if it is the kind of thing that can be F in virtue of being H, or J, 
etc.) This means that fundamental kinds can determine not only which non-basic 
properties a thing can have, and, therefore, which non-basic properties a thing can 
have in virtue of which base properties, but also which base properties out of a cer-
tain class of such properties are able to make instances of the relevant kind have cer-
tain non-basic properties.30   
 
  Thinking Parts 
 
 
I have argued that the notion of kind-dependent grounding can perform useful 
metaphysical work within the context of a view that allows for non-basic diﬀerences 
                                                   
 30 This response might require us to modify Weak Formality even further. Instead of replacing 
this principle with Kind-Dependent Formality, we might now need to replace it with (letting ‘KG’ 
stands for the predicate ‘is the kind of thing such that, if it is G, then it is F in virtue of being G’): 
 
 Kind-Dependent Formality*   
  (x) (F) (G) (Gx < Fx) → (y) □ [(Gy & (KF y & KGy)→ (Gy < Fy))] 
  
I propose, however, not to dwell on this further modification in what follows. 
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between coincident entities (§). In this section, I show that this notion can also 
perform valuable work even if we don’t countenance coincident things. My strategy 
will be to consider a problem that arises even if we don’t allow for coinciding ob-
jects, before explaining how appealing to kind-dependent grounding can solve it. 
 The problem is known as the ‘thinking parts problem’.31 The trouble is that 
whilst it seems like I’m the only conscious being in my vicinity, there’s an argument 
to show that I—like all other human persons—contain a ‘mighty host’ of conscious 
beings within my borders. Yet clearly this is absurd. For ‘[t]here is not a mighty 
host of conscious, reflective, pain- and pleasure-feeling objects now sitting in my 
chair, now wearing my shirt, now thinking about this paper’ (Merricks : ). 
 The problem turns on two plausible ideas. The first of these is that at least some 
of our conscious properties are intrinsic. (In general, a property is intrinsic just in 
case the things that have it do so solely in virtue of how they are in and of them-
selves, and not in virtue of how they are related to other disjoint things.) Many ar-
guments for this premise may be given—here I’ll just note two considerations.  
 First, it seems intuitive to think that there could be a ‘lonely’ object that is 
 conscious (cf. Merricks ). That is, it seems that something could be conscious 
despite being the only object that exists. This suggests that at least some conscious 
properties are intrinsic properties. For if a lonely being can be conscious, there are 
at least some conscious properties a lonely being can have. These properties would 
then appear to be intrinsic. (In general, if a property passes the ‘isolation test’—i.e., 
if it is instantiable by a lonely object—this is a strong indicator that it is intrinsic.) 
 Second, there is the intuition that an intrinsic duplicate of one of us would have 
to be conscious. Consider, for example, ‘swampman’, an intrinsic duplicate of one 
of us ‘forged by fortuitous happenings in a swamp’ (cf. Hawthorne : n. ). 
Many of us share the intuition that swampman would have to be conscious, due to 
being an intrinsic duplicate of a conscious being (one of us). This again suggests 
that there are at least some intrinsic conscious properties. For it seems to suggest 
that at least some such properties are necessarily shared by intrinsic duplicates. 
 The second core premise concerns the grounds of our intrinsic conscious proper-
ties. The core claim is that if a material thing has some conscious property F, then 
there is some intrinsic microphysical property M, such that the object has F in virtue 
having M. This second premise flows from three ideas. The first is the idea that con-
sciousness is a non-basic property of persons and is, therefore, grounded in some 
more basic property (or congeries thereof). The second is the idea that the non-basic 
properties of material objects are grounded in their microphysical properties (i.e. 
Microphysicalism). The third is the idea that in general, intrinsic properties have 
intrinsic grounds. Given the first two claims, it follows that when a person has a 
given conscious property, she has this property in virtue of having some more basic 
microphysical property The third idea then ensures that the microphysical proper-
ties that ground intrinsic conscious properties are themselves intrinsic.  
 Now consider some arbitrary human person, P. And let ‘P-minus’ denote the 
large proper part of P that consists of all of P minus his left foot. (Of course, P and  
P-minus are distinct, for no object is identical to one of its proper parts. And things 
                                                   
 31 There are several discussions of this problem in the literature. See Burke (, ); Dorr 
(); Hawley (); Kovacs (); Merricks (, : ch. ); Noonan (); Olson 
(); Robinson (); Sider (). For discussions of the thinking parts problem within the 
context of the personal identity debate see Blatti (); Madden (); Olson (: ch. ). 
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that are distinct are necessarily so.) Lastly, consider some other human person, Q, 
which has all of the same intrinsic microphysical properties as P.32 
 We now suppose that Q loses his left foot and survives.33 This means that Q is 
no longer an intrinsic microphysical duplicate of P, and is instead an intrinsic mi-
crophysical duplicate of P-minus. This, in turn, entails that Q and P-minus now 
share all their intrinsic microphysical properties. 
 From the first premise set out above—that at least some of our conscious prop-
erties are intrinsic—we can suppose that Q instantiates (after the loss of his left 
foot) some intrinsic conscious property C. Then, given the second core premise, 
which tells us that intrinsic conscious properties always have intrinsic microphysical 
grounds (there are more basic microphysical properties that are themselves intrin-
sic), we can then infer that Q has C in virtue of having some intrinsic microphysical 
property M: 
 
 () Q has intrinsic conscious property C in virtue of having intrinsic micro- 
  physical property M. 
 
This then implies: 
  
 () Q has intrinsic microphysical property M. 
 
But Q and P-minus share intrinsic microphysical properties. Therefore, from (), 
we can infer: 
 
 () P-minus has intrinsic microphysical property M. 
 
However, by Weak Formality, we can infer from () that: 
 
 () If any object whatsoever has intrinsic microphysical property M, then it  
  has conscious property C in virtue of having M.  
 
From () and () we can then infer: 
 
 () P-minus has conscious property C in virtue of having intrinsic microphys- 
  ical property M. 
 
And this entails: 
 
 () P-minus has conscious property C. 
 
                                                   
 32 For present purposes, we can think of the intrinsic microphysical properties of an object as 
being a function of its individual intrinsic properties of, and the spatiotemporal and causal relations 
obtaining between, its microphysical parts (cf. Merricks ). Given this conception of an intrinsic 
microphysical property, there is no barrier to supposing that two persons (or a person and a large 
proper part thereof) might be intrinsic microphysical duplicates. 
 33 There is a delicate question as to what happens here (in cases where an object O loses a part P 
but survives, thus seemingly becoming coincident with what once was a large proper part of it O-P, 
i.e. the part that comprised all of O besides P). For my views of this matter see Moran (). 
 
 
 
 
Which then implies: 
 
 () P-minus is conscious.34 
 
At this point, we have proven that the human person, P, contains a conscious prop-
er part, namely, P-minus. But the reasoning here could easily be extended to prove, 
not only that P-minus contains a whole multitude of such conscious parts, but also 
that the same is true for every one of us. It is in this way that we end up with the 
absurd result that each one of us contains multitudinous conscious beings.35  
 There are various ways in which one might respond to this problem. One could 
contest the implicit idea that human persons are complex material beings—and 
hence the kind of thing that can have intrinsic microphysical properties.36 Or one 
could deny that there are any intrinsic conscious properties, holding instead that all 
such properties are extrinsic (Burke ; Hawley ; Sider ). One might 
argue whilst there are some intrinsic conscious properties, such properties are not 
grounded in more basic microphysical properties (Merricks , ). Or, one 
could dispute the idea that there are such entities as P-minus in the first place; that 
is, one could contest the claim that we human persons have large undetached prop-
er parts (Olson , ). 
 It seems to me, however, that each of these options is rather radical. It is certain-
ly radical to hold, in line with either the first or the last option, that we aren’t com-
plex material things, or that we do not have large undetached proper parts. The 
more plausible view is surely that we are complex material things, with various large 
proper parts, including heads and an upper-halves, etc. It also looks quite radical to 
hold either that there are no intrinsic conscious properties, or that such properties 
are not microphysically grounded. We are therefore left with but one option: reject 
Weak Formality and thereby block the inference from () and () to (). 
 This is the answer to the thinking parts problem I recommend. On this view, 
there is a diﬀerence in fundamental kind between we persons and our large proper 
parts, such that whilst we human persons are the kind of object that can be con-
scious and have mental properties, the same is not true of our large proper parts.37 
Given this view, it follows that all conscious properties are ‘kind-dependent proper-
ties’, which can be had only by things of certain kinds. We can then claim that 
when the person, Q, has conscious property C, she has this property in virtue of 
having intrinsic microphysical property M only given that she is the sort of object 
                                                   
 34 I assume here that having at least one conscious property is suﬃcient for being conscious. 
Given that conscious properties are determinates of the determinable consciousness, this claim follows 
from the more general idea that having a determinate of some determinable is suﬃcient for having 
the determinable itself.  
 35 This conclusion is absurd in and of itself. But it also gives rise to various troubling ethical 
problems. See Johnston () and Unger (, ). 
 36 Cf. Unger (, ) and Zimmerman (), who, in connection with two other prob-
lems which seem to over-generate conscious beings, advocate adopting an immaterialist view on 
which we human persons are immaterial entities.  
 37 This view presupposes no particular view about what kind of thing we human persons most 
fundamentally are. It states only that whatever kind of thing we are, things of that kind are able to be 
conscious (at least in propitious circumstances), whilst the same is not true of our large proper parts.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
able that is able to be conscious in the first place. If this is right, then it follows that 
() is more perspicuously written as: 
 
 (*) Q has intrinsic conscious property C in virtue of having intrinsic micro- 
   physical property M, whereby this grounding relation holds only given  
   that Q is the kind of thing that it is. 
 
Claim () would then have to be rejected in favour of: 
 
 (*) If any object whatsoever has intrinsic microphysical property M, then if  
   that object is the kind of thing that can be conscious, it has conscious  
   property C in virtue of having microphysical property M.  
 
Just as before, however, accepting (*) in place of () implies that we should aban-
don Weak Formality, and replace it with Kind-Dependent Formality.  
 The crucial point here is that if (*) is true instead of (), then we can no longer 
obtain (), () and (), and hence, we can avoid the conclusion that each of us con-
tains a mighty host of conscious proper parts. Moreover, we do not have to make 
any of the radical moves noted above that other authors have made.38 
 On the proposed view, our intrinsic conscious properties are fully grounded by 
intrinsic microphysical properties. Moreover, there are large proper parts of human 
persons that share these intrinsic microphysical properties. However, these large 
proper parts do not instantiate intrinsic conscious properties, despite instantiating 
their (conditional) microphysical grounds. This is because such properties can only 
be instantiated by things of a certain kind. Since the large proper parts of human 
persons are not the kind of thing that can be conscious, it follows that the large 
proper parts of human persons do not have any conscious properties, despite some 
of them having all the necessary microphysical properties.39  
 Rejecting Weak Formality, therefore, and replacing it with Kind-Dependent 
Formality provides us with an attractive way to handle the thinking parts problem. 
                                                   
 38 One might wonder if we have only gained a Pyrrhic victory here. For we have avoided having 
to saying that consciousness is brute, yet at the cost of having to introduce brute fundamental kinds. 
Two points are to be made here. We can distinguish between how something is and what something 
is (cf. §). To say that something is conscious seems clearly to say merely how it is (cf. van Inwagen: 
: —). So it does not seem plausible to take consciousness as basic. Whereas to specify 
the fundamental kind of an object is to disclose its nature: to specify what it is. Thus it does seem, by 
contrast, much more plausible to treat fundamental kinds as basic (i.e. ungrounded). 
 The second thing to say is that one could develop the present strategy by treating the kind that 
we persons fall under as grounded but extrinsic. However, this requires accepting that there can be 
extrinsic conditions on the possession of an intrinsic property—for again, we wish to retain the view 
that at least some conscious properties are intrinsic. I explain how this goes in Moran (under review). 
 39 One might wonder whether this view is really consistent with taking some of our conscious 
properties to be intrinsic. After all, this view seems to imply that Lewisian duplicates (things that 
have precisely the same perfectly natural properties and relations) can diﬀer in terms of these proper-
ties (we can imagine a person and a proper part of some person that are Lewisian duplicates), yet one 
could reasonably take this to show that none of these properties is intrinsic. I have tackled this objec-
tion elsewhere, and so I won’t address it here. Suﬃce it to say that so far as I can see, the present 
proposal does not in any way impugn the claim that at least some of our conscious properties are 
intrinsic. (Note for instance that on the present view, the allegedly intrinsic conscious properties 
only ever have intrinsic grounds. This is arguably suﬃcient to show that such properties are intrinsic.  
 
 
 
 
For if the former principle is replaced by the latter, then, given the intuitive claim 
that whilst persons are the kind of thing that can be conscious, the same is not true 
of their (large) proper parts, it follows that even though persons and the large proper 
parts thereof can have the same intrinsic microphysical properties, it is only ever the 
persons, never their parts, that are conscious in virtue of having such properties. 
Therefore, since the thinking parts problem arises even for those who don’t believe 
in coincident things, there may be reason for everyone—not just those who accept 
coincident objects—to hold that Weak Formality fails, and that the closest thing 
that holds instead is Kind-Dependent Formality. 
 It might be noted, moreover, that this reply to the thinking parts problem can 
be extended to handle a whole range of related problems, which arise whenever two 
or more material objects (that diﬀer in kind) fail to share some non-basic intrinsic 
property whilst being intrinsic microphysical duplicates. For whenever such cases 
arise, that is, when two intrinsic microphysical duplicates x and y are such that x has 
intrinsic property F and y lacks it, we can say that whilst the objects share their mi-
crophysical properties, these properties can do their grounding work only in the 
case of x and not in the case of y, for it is only x that is the kind of thing that can 
instantiate the relevant non-basic intrinsic property in question.40  
 The solution to the thinking parts problem developed here, therefore, suggests a 
more general style of a reply to a broader range of problems. These share a common 
structure: they arise whenever two material objects that diﬀer in kind are intrinsic 
microphysical duplicates and yet diﬀer regarding some non-basic intrinsic property. 
 
  Conclusion  
 
 
The thesis of Weak Formality tells us that if one thing, a, is F in virtue of  
being G, then any possible object that is G is F in virtue of being G. What I have 
argued here is that despite its intuitive appeal, one can plausibly reject this principle 
by appealing to cases of kind-dependent grounding. Specifically, I have argued that 
there is theoretical utility in treating certain cases as being cases of kind-dependent 
grounding, whereby these cases show that Weak Formality fails.  
 I have focused on two metaphysical problems. The first arises if we grant that 
coincident objects (of diﬀerent kinds) can diﬀer in terms of their non-basic proper-
ties. The problem is that since the properties are non-basic, it is hard to see how the 
coincident entities could fail to share them, without ending up facing contradiction. 
The second arises even without the assumption that entities can coincide. Here, the 
trouble is that it can apparently be shown that each of us contains manifold con-
scious proper parts. Yet evidently, this is not the case. 
 What I have tried to show is that both problems can be given elegant solutions 
if we appeal to the notion of kind-dependent grounding, and thus reject Weak 
Formality. I submit that this gives us good reason to reject this principle, and to 
believe that there are genuine cases of kind-dependent grounding. 
                                                   
 40 Think, for example, of a case involving a statue and some intrinsic microphysical duplicate of 
it that is itself a mere proper part of some larger block of marble. Intuitively, only the statue is intrin-
sically beautiful, not the embedded hunk of marble, despite the fact that both items have the same 
intrinsic microphysical properties. I suggest that we can account for this while preserving Microphys-
icalism by saying that only the statue is the kind of thing that can be intrinsically beautiful. 
 
 
 
 
 In short, we began by asking whether it is so that if one thing, a, is F in virtue of 
being G, does it follow that everything that is G must be F for that reason? The  
answer is that there appears to be good reason not to accept this. For it appears that 
maintaining otherwise, by holding that there can be cases of kind-dependent 
grounding, has theoretical utility, insofar as it enables us to solve a range of meta-
physical problems. (It may even be serviceable for solving problems I have yet to 
consider. I would encourage the reader to explore whether this is the case.41) 
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